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We present an information based model of leadership in a setting that exhibits the familiar 
problems of free riding and coordination failure. Leaders have superior information about the 
value of the project in hand and can send a costly signal to their uninformed followers to 
persuade them to cooperate in the project. Followers voluntarily choose whether or not to follow 
the better informed leader. We provide experimental evidence that, when the leaders’ gender is 
revealed to their followers, female subjects hesitate to lead (send a costly signal) while 
followers’ behavior does not indicate any gender discrimination. Such behavior is not observed 
among the male leaders.  
 
















 Introduction  
 
There is considerable experimental evidence indicating that the behavior of men and 
women differs in a variety of issues such as risk aversion (e.g. Byrness, Miller, and Schafer, 
1999), altruism (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), and competition (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle, 
and Rusticchini, 2003). Our experimental study contributes to this literature by focusing on 
leadership.  
Today women are capable and active in the society but have failed to attain leadership 
positions consistent with their representation. While discrimination maybe one explanation of 
this shortfall, it does not explain it all. If women believe that they are less likely to be followed 
than men, they may refuse to accept leadership roles that are often costly for the leaders.  
We present a single-shot, collective action game in which free riding and coordination 
failures can prevent group cooperation. In our setting, leaders, informed about the value of the 
project in hand, have the incentive to persuade group cooperation by sending a costly signal to 
their followers indicating that cooperation is worthwhile. We observe no gender discrimination 
by the followers but find evidence that female subjects are significantly more eager to lead in 
anonymous environments, where their gender is not known to their followers, than they are in 
environments where their gender is known to their followers. Such a pattern is not observed 
among the male subjects.  
 
Experiment 
The experimental design is based on a theoretical model by Komai and Stegeman (2006) 
and Komai, et al (2007).  An experimental session consists of 5 groups of 3 playing ten rounds of 
a single-shot, collective action game. Subjects begin each round with $10 endowments and decide whether or not to invest their endowments in a group project. In each round three possible 
payoff scenarios are assigned to each group with equal probability (Table 1).  
Table 1  







































Scenarios vary across groups and change each round. In Scenarios 1 and 2, well-being is 
maximized if all players fully cooperate. Participation in Scenario 3 is bad for the group and 
individual group members.  No player is willing to participate by himself in any scenario. There 
are increasing returns to participation in Scenarios 1 and 2. In Scenario 2 free riding is strictly 
dominant. In Scenario 1 players prefer to participate if they believe that the other two group 
members will participate. In Scenario 2, strict dominance of the free riding strategy, and in 
Scenario 1, failure of coordination can prevent efficient group cooperation.
1 
Each group has a leader who is aware of the assigned scenario. The others two members 
of the group (the followers) know only the possible scenarios and their likelihood.  The leader 
moves first, deciding whether or not to invest.  Followers observe their leader’s decision before 
they simultaneously and separately make theirs.  The leader has the incentive to invest in 
Scenarios 1 and 2 (to send a positive signal to his followers) and followers have the incentive to 
                                                 
1 Under complete information. follow the leader because the leader has more information about what they should do than they 
themselves have.
2 
We use a random rematching design: group composition and the leader-follower roles 
change each round. This rematching procedure was introduced by Andreoni (1988) in public 
good experiments to balance the desire to test a single-shot prediction with the need for repeated 
experience by the subjects.  
What activities can represent our game? One example (Franzen 1995) is signing a 
petition or donating money for some common good. Both activities are costly. A typical person 
has no incentive to participate alone. More participation helps the cause. Potential participants 
have the incentive to free ride.
3 The game is a single-shot game because players may not get 
exposed to the same project or may not be with the same people again. Our model is also 
appropriate for taskforces (temporary units, or ad hoc committees established to work on a 
single-shot collective activity).  
Subjects’ earnings are privately announced after each round using identification numbers.  
Subjects are told that only one, randomly chosen round determines their final earnings and thus 
they should always make their best decision.  
Two treatments were designed:  
•  Gender Signaling Treatment (GST): Leaders’ gender is revealed to their followers 
(followers’ decision sheets indicate whether the leader was male or female).
4 
                                                 
2 A precise characterization of the equilibrium is available upon request. 
3 However, if the project  is highly valued (Scenario 1) and if a large number of players participate, participating 
may become more appealing than not because participants may not only gain from the success of the project but also 
may enjoy a positive political status or a sense of pride for being a participant. 
4 In the real world, potential followers are aware of their leaders’ gender: in some contexts (like in politics) the 
gender of female leaders is explicitly talked about.  To start, we choose the extreme manipulation of directly 
revealing the leader’s gender rather than the more subtle manipulation of using he or she terminology.  If we were 
unable to find a difference in behavior using our manipulation, differences are unlikely to be observed under more 
subtle manipulations. •  Gender Anonymous Treatment (GAT): followers are unaware of their leader’s 
gender. 
Our null hypothesis is that the same pattern of behavior should be observed in both 
treatments since the leaders’ gender is irrelevant to their information signaling role.  
Four sessions of each treatment were conducted. In each session we attempted to have 8 
subjects of one sex and seven of the other, or as close to this split as possible.
5  Subjects are 
recruited by e-mail and posters.  Instructions are read aloud and subjects are tested to make sure 
they understand them.
6  Decisions were anonymous; subjects were identified by random 5-digit 
identification numbers.  Sessions lasted about 70 minutes. Average earning was $12.10 in the 
GST and $12.29 in the GAT (no showup fee).  Subjects’ socioeconomic characteristics did not 
differ significantly across treatments.  
 
Results and Discussion 
To analyze followers’ behavior, we combined all three scenarios.
7 A total of 400 
decisions were made by followers in each treatment. We conducted random effect Probit 
regressions estimating followers’ probability of investment in both the GAT and the GST (see 
Table 2). We found a positive and significant correlation between followers’ investment 
decisions and their leader’s decision to invest in both treatments, but no significant relationship 
between the followers’ decisions, their own gender, or their leader’s gender.
8  
                                                 
5 No session had more than 9 of one sex. 
6  In a post-experiment survey subjects were asked about how clear the instructions were (1= unclear … 5 = very 
clear); 60% responded 5 and the rest 4. 
7 Because followers are uninformed about the assigned scenario (the only source of information for the followers is 
the decision made by their leader). 
8 The following variables were jointly insignificant: subjects’ major, GPA, and clarity of the instructions. Followers might have ignored the leaders’ gender thinking that gender is irrelevant to the 
leaders’ signal or might have acted out of political correctness thinking this is what is expected 
of them. We cannot completely dismiss the latter, but are inclined to discount it because 
decisions are anonymous and financially motivated (non-self-serving decisions are costly).  
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L.L.F.  -181.5 -173.9 
 
To analyze leaders’ behavior we consider each scenario separately.
9  Leaders made 133 
decisions in Scenario 3 (both treatments combined) and, except for 1 leader, nobody invested.  In 
Scenario 1, leaders made a total of 127 decisions.  In every instance but 8, leaders invested 
regardless of their gender or the treatment. 
                                                 
9 Because leaders are aware of the assigned scenario.  
The interesting scenario is Scenario 2 in which leaders made 140 decisions (both 
treatments combined).
 10 A preliminary data analysis suggested that while the male leaders’ 
investment decision was not affected by the treatment, female leaders invested significantly less 
in the GST than they did in the GAT. We conducted Probit regressions estimating leaders’ 
probability of investment in scenario 2 (see Table 3).
11 
The regression results show that the GST has a negative and significant effect on the 
investment decision of female leaders: when the leaders’ gender is known, female leaders 
hesitate to lead (send a costly signal). Male leaders follow the same behavioral pattern regardless 
of the treatment and the pattern is insignificantly different from that of female leaders in the 
GAT.
12 
























                                                 
10 Out of 140 decisions, 82 were made by male leaders (43 in the GST and 39 in the GAT), and 58 by females (36 in 
the GST and 22 in the GAT). The difference in the number of decisions made by men and women reflects the 
slightly greater number of male subjects and the random assignments which were determined prior to the experiment 
by ID number.  The ID numbers were randomly allocated to subjects.   
11 The model was originally estimated with random effects. Estimated rho was either less than 0.001 or insignificant. 
Probit results are reported. 
12 Footnote 7 applies. Our interpretation is that female leaders expect less cooperation from their followers in 
the GST, where their gender is revealed, than they do in the GAT, where their gender remains 
unknown. Female leaders, therefore, become less eager to send a costly signal in the GST, in 
Scenario 2, where followers’ refusal to follow significantly jeopardizes their payoff. This 
behavior is not observed in Scenario 1, where followers’ refusal to follow the leader does not 
harm her as much as it does in Scenario 2.  In Scenario 2 (Scenario 1), the investing leader loses 
$1 (earns $3) if 1 follower refuses to invest and loses $5 (loses $3) if they both do. 
Our results seem similar to the “Stereotype Threat” in psychology (Steel, 1997).  The 
theme of this literature is that individuals who are targets of negative ability stereotypes 
(females, African Americans, Latinos, etc) are at risk of doing poorly on tests of ability for 
reasons such as self-doubt (the literature is mostly focused on verbal, mathematical, and 
analytical tests, while our study focuses on leadership).  
The significant difference in the behavior of our female leaders could also be a reaction 
to similar social devaluations. In our case, however, the reaction of female leaders may be 
affected more by their pessimism about the reaction of their followers rather than self-doubt.  
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